长平谁是谁非

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作者：古畑康雄・ジャーナリスト

ネット用語から読み解く中国　
（１９）「被代表」

前回は韓寒の３本のコラムから、公共知識人のあり方を考えるという、かなり肩に力の入った内容となり、字数も引用が多いとは言え７０００字を超える長文になってしまった（本当はもっと書き込みたかった）。ただ、うれしいことに中国知識人研究が専門の友人、Oさんから以下のようなご感想をいただいた。

「インターネットの言論空間を、折々のトピックや人物から迫っていく（筆者の）手法は、中国社会をとらえる上で、いつも、多くのことを教えて頂いていますが、今回は、特に、自分がもっとも関心のある『公共知識人』に関する議論なので、色々と考えるきっかけになり、自分自身の課題にも、非常に参考にさせて頂いています。（中略）個人的には、コラムの最後の一文が、とても好きです。中国社会に対する厳しくもあたたかいまなざしが、伝わってくるように思っています」

Oさんのような専門家に拙文を読んでいただき、過分のご評価をいただくのは、今後の励みになる。
さて、今回まず紹介したいのは、著名なジャーナリストで友人でもある長平氏のことだ。友人などと書くと、何を偉そうな、と思われる人もいるだろうが、２年前に北京でお会いし、２０１０年１月に東京と札幌で開かれたシンポジウムに参加いただき、さらに筆者が所属するメディアでインタビューをさせてもらったのがきっかけで、その後もツイッター、フェースブックでお付き合いしている。

長平氏に関し、読売新聞が最近出した「中国活動家次々出国」という記事の中で「改革派新聞社の名記者だった長平氏はドイツに渡り」とあるのが目に止まった。

２０１１年１月、南方週末、南方都市報のベテラン記者、編集者だった長平（本名は張平）氏はジャスミン革命などが引き金となったメディアへの締め付け強化で、両紙を発行する南方報業集団を追われ、広州から香港に移住した。

ラジオ自由アジア報道（２０１１年１２月７日）によると、会社側は長平氏に「筆を折って沈黙するか、これまでの立場を変えるか」どちらかの選択を迫ったという。報道によれば、長平氏の解雇には共産党中央宣伝部のトップクラスの人物が圧力をかけたとの見方も出ている。その後、長平氏は香港のテレビ局が発行する電子雑誌「陽光時務」の編集長に就任したが、香港政府は長平氏にビザを発給しなかった。引き続き中国当局からの圧力を受けたとみられ、「国境なき記者団」は香港当局に抗議のメールを送っている。さらに、長平氏が開設した微博（短文書きこみサイト）は一方的に削除されるなど、様々な嫌がらせの中、やむを得ずドイツ行きを選んだようだ。

北京で初めて会った時、「自分は新聞社で長年働いてきたので、どこまで書けば当局の規制に引っかかるか、その『尺度』はわきまえているつもりだ」と述べていた長平氏だったが、当局側の度を超えた規制強化の動きに、彼のような人物すら壁の外に追いやられてしまったのは、残念でならない。

さっそく、この記事を紹介するメールを長平氏にも送った。するとお礼と共に最近次のようなインタビューを受けたとご返事をいただいた。
“Is
Democracy Chinese? An Interview with Journalist Chang
Ping”
インタビューは前述した経緯のほか、彼の生い立ち、学生時代、天安門事件の時の状況などについて触れた後、今回の韓寒の文章でも問題になった中国と民主の問題について次のように答えている。

「中国には民主が必要だと考えており、中国は変革が必要だ。私は中国には民主主義が育たないという議論に本当に反対だ。中国は特殊で、中国人の素養（中国語では「素质」）は不十分なので、時間がかかるといった愚かな議論だ。民主主義は中国文化の中には存在しなかったという人もいたが、（中国文化圏の）台湾は民主化したではないか。すると彼らは台湾は特殊だという。だが烏坎（注：広東省陸豊市烏坎村）はどうか、彼らは自ら選挙を行ったではないか。烏坎は典型的な中国であり、烏坎が民主を実践できるのなら、中国の他の部分も同様（に可能）なのだ」

質問者の「韓寒のコラムについてどう思うか？」との問いにはこう答えている。

「韓寒は、中国の人々は素養が低く、もし民主を導入すれば暴力につながるから問題だと論じている。これは（中国）政府が長年宣伝してきた見方だ。まるで『あなたは泳げるようになるまで、泳ぎの練習をしてはいけない』と言っているようなもので、練習できないのだから泳げるわけがない。そして、提起した議論は真新しいものでもなかった」

「だが彼がこの問題を提起したのは興味深いことだ。このことは中国ではいかに政治的システムが制限されているかということを示したのだ。今我々が目にしているのは、多くの人々が、変革が起きることへの望みを失っていることであり、そして彼らはなぜそれが起きないのかの言い訳をしている。モラルの衰退が反対者らに対する暴力へとつながっているが、それは革命を手に入れられないからだ」と述べている。

正直、前回自分の書いた韓寒への見方と長平氏のそれとにあまり違いがないと知ってほっとした。
さて、長平氏がシンポジウムで述べたのは「被代表」という当時は耳慣れない言葉をめぐる議論だった。これは２００９年末に広州市番禺区で起きたゴミ焼却場建設をめぐる問題だ。シンポジウムの発表によれば次のような経過だった。

０９年１１月、１０００人以上の広州市民が同市庁舎前に集合、抗議活動を展開、これは１９８９年以来広州で発生した最大規模の抗議活動だった。この運動の原因は、番禺区に建設が計画されたゴミ焼却発電所への反対だった。政府は５年もの間、密かに建設計画を進め、住民は全く知らされていなかった。環境アセスメントなどの法的プロセスを経ずに、地元政府は建設を発表した。

番禺事件で大多数の住民がプロジェクトに反対していた時、地元紙「番禺日報」は１面に、番禺区の人民代表大会代表７０数人が計画用地を視察後、「ごみ焼却発電所は民心工程（国民生活向上のためのプロジェクト）であり、政府がこの民心工程建設を加速することを大いに支持する」と述べたとの記事を掲載した。

このように、住民の民意に反して、勝手に一部の人間に「賛成」だと民意を代表されてしまう、これが「被代表」の意味だ。

抗議活動で住民は「不被代表」というスローガンを掲げた。自分の意思は誰にも代表されることはない、という表明だ。「このスローガンは公民個人の権利意識の自覚を意味する。『不被代表』によって初めて政府の役人は真の民意を知ることができるし、真の代表が生まれるのだ」長平氏はこのように述べている。

住民の抗議に対して、市側は態度を軟化、０９年１２月、番禺区の党委員会書記は住民に対し建設中止を発表した。広州市政府はさらに、今後住民の利益と密接に関わる重大な政策は、幅広く民意を聞き、十分な調査をすることを決めた規定を発表した。

だが中国国内の報道を見ていると、被代表は枚挙にいとまがない。例えばハルビン市で０９年１２月、水道料金値上げに関する公聴会で、市民代表の劉天暁という男性がペットボトルの瓶を投げつけるという事件があった。

出席した13人の市民代表のうち、下崗（レイオフ）された労働者として出席したのは、実は退職した同市の幹部だった上、唯一値上げに反対した劉天暁氏は発言の機会が与えられなかったことから、ペットボトルを投げつけて抗議したのだ。こうした偽代表を使って民意を偽り、一方的に政府の決定をごり押しする手法は番禺のケースと共通する。この事件は「瓶子門」（「～門」は「～事件」の意味で、米国のウォーターゲートから来ており、中国のメディア、ネットでしばしば使われる表現）としてネット、メディアでも広く伝えられ、同様の公聴会への批判が高まった。

この「被」という言葉が中国社会で広がったのは、０９年ごろだ。本来なら「～される」はずのないことまで、「被～」とする表現が次々と生まれ、「被時代」という言葉も生まれた。中国のサイト「互動百科」は次のように説明する。

「被時代では、誰かが『☓☓される』ということは、必ず他人に『☓☓する』人がいるということだ。ある人の権利が主張することができず、勝手に侵犯される、その一方で他人を圧迫して権利を享受するものが必ずいる」。そして次のような「被」の数々を紹介している。

「被自殺」…２００８年３月、安徽省阜陽市潁泉区の張治安書記が違法に農地を収用し、さらにはホワイトハウスのような豪華な庁舎を建てたことを告発していた李国福さんが、監獄内の病院で死亡したが、検察機関は「李さんは首つり自殺した」との調査結果を発表、家族はこれを受け入れなかった。（報道によると、その後張治安は汚職の疑いで逮捕され、１審で執行猶予付き死刑判決を受けた。）

「被小康」…「小康」とは「ややゆとりのある生活水準」の意味だが、０９年２月、江蘇省が南通市管轄下の県、市にたいして小康に達したかどうかの電話民意調査を実施した際、地元政府は調査を受けた住民らに対し模範答案を事前に配布、家庭平均年収は、農民は８５００元、都市住民は１６５００元であると答えるよう求めたという。その結果、元々は小康レベルにない住民が、一夜のうちに小康にされてしまった。

「被増長」…０９年７月２８日、国家統計局が今年前半の全国都市住民の平均収入は１１．２％、農民は８．１％増加と発表、都市住民の伸びはGDPの伸び７．１％を上回ったが、「物価は上がっても自分の所得は増えていない。この数字は水増しではないか」と多くの人々が疑問を抱いた。

「被自願」…０９年５月の新京報報道によると、重慶市銅梁県の保護者らが、学校に９０００元の「教師節慰問金」を支払うよう要求されたと訴えた（教師節は９月１０日、教師に日ごろの感謝や尊敬の気持ちを示す行事）。保護者が教育委員会に意見を述べたところ、「お金を返すのなら、教師を引き上げる」と告げられた。銅梁県教育長は取材に「保護者は自ら望んで支払った」と述べたという。

「被就業」…７月１２日、西北政法大学の０９年卒業生だった趙冬冬さんは、国内の著名なウェブサイトに、自ら知らないうちに大学が西安のある企業と就職協議書にサインしたが、このような企業は聞いたこともないと書き込んだ。一部の大学は学生の就職率が高いことを宣伝するため、このような水増しを行なっているとされる。

今月のことば

被代表：自分の意志が勝手に第３者によって代弁されてしまうこと。多くは世論操作のため、当局の都合のよい形で使われる。

被時代：被代表、被自殺、被小康、被就業など、「被～」が社会現象を表すネット流行語として次々と登場した時代状況を指す。自分の権利を第３者が勝手に左右されることは許さないという権利意識の向上もうかがえる。

「～門」：事件、スキャンダルの意味で、米国のウォーターゲート（水門）事件から来ており、中国のメディア、ネットでしばしば使われる表現。
「被購物」…１０年７月、香港を旅行した中国の客がお土産屋で買い物をしなかったことで、旅行ガイドが「こんな安い値段で旅行できるわけがない」と罵る動画がネットで広がった。香港観光局は謝罪したが、「買い物をさせられる」という言葉がこうして広まった。

その他にも、人権活動家などを対象にした次のような「被」もある。
「被旅遊」…当局からマークされた活動家らが、政治的に敏感な時期（全人代開催、天安門事件記念日など）に当局から外地に無理やり連れだされること。昨年の各地方の人民代表選挙でも独立候補者と呼ばれる候補者が登場したが、当局により選挙活動に参加できないよう、外地に連れ出された。さらには、風俗産業が盛んなことで知られる広東省東莞市では掃黄（わいせつ取り締まり運動）期間中、風俗嬢らが外地に旅行させられたとの報道もある。
「被喝茶」…活動家らが、当局からお茶を飲まないかと呼び出されること。実際には尋問に近い。人権活動家、劉暁波氏のノーベル平和賞受賞に対し、成都市の女性が上海万博のノルウエー館を訪問、花束を贈ったことで、警察からマークされ、「被喝茶」された問題は以前「東方」で紹介した。
>>>２０１０年１２月号「中国のネットは劉暁波受賞をどう伝えたか」参照
「被時代」は社会的な弱者が他者（多くは権力者）により、自らの意思に反することを一方的に認めさせられるという中国社会の現実を示すとともに、自分の権利を第３者が勝手に左右されることは許さないという権利意識の向上がうかがえる。

番禺では住民らがゴミ焼却発電所の建設阻止に動き、当局に認めさせた。そして、最近でも、「被代表」を集団的な抗議活動により拒んだのが長平氏も指摘した広東省烏坎村の住民抗議運動だった。

烏坎については、日本メディアも多く報じているが、村の役人の不正に対抗して村民が大規模な抗議運動を展開、一次は当局による弾圧も懸念されたが、広東省政府は住民の訴えを認め、村民代表の選挙やり直しを命じた。そして２月１１日、村民は自らの村民代表（村議に相当）１０７人を自らが管理する選挙により選出した。

ツイッターで長平氏が紹介した烏坎の民主選挙の映像を見た。民主的な抗議運動により、広東省政府から譲歩を勝ち取った村の書記、林祖鑾さんは「事の大小にかかわらず、我々はついに関門を突破した。（今回の結果は）党中央から民衆まで、皆にとって喜ばしいものだ」と語った。抗議活動の中で父親を殺害された女性も、投票日「父の霊前に報告した。（民主的な選挙は）父が望んでいたことだったから」と涙を見せながら語った。

だがこれはまだ末端で始まった民主化の実験にすぎない。国を追われた長平氏のようなジャーナリストが再び祖国の土を踏める時こそ、「被時代」が終わりを告げる時だ。それがいつなのかは分からないが、秋の党大会で誕生する共産党の新指導体制が烏坎村の経験をどう位置づけるのか、そしてネットを中心とした大衆の声にどう答えるかが一つの鍵と言えるだろう。長平氏が自由に中国と海外を行き来できるような日が再び訪れれば、ぜひ２年前のように再びお会いし、酒を酌み交わしたい。

South China Morning Post
Columns
2011-12-06

Chang Ping sees the irony of holding up care for the old and young as ‘traditional’ Chinese values while, in reality, an increasingly corrupt society affords the most vulnerable scant protection from harm

A minibus that should seat only nine people was crammed with 64, all but two of them children. On its way to a kindergarten, the minibus collidedwith a coal truck and, as a result, 21 people were killed and the others injured. This tragic accident that happened last month in Zhengning county, Gansu, sparked a nationwide debate on the safety of school buses in China.

It is hard to imagine how more than 60 children could be squeezed into such a small van. But those of us who were shocked by this “feat” should also remember that, in many remote villages, having a bus to squeeze into is considered fortunate. Only the better-off families can afford school transport for their children. The contrast between the profligacy of corrupt government and the dire poverty of rural education could not be greater.

A look at school buses in developed countries shows that people in the West love their children more than we do. According to reports on the internet and in the press, transport for school children in the West is strictly regulated: the buses are sturdily built and traffic rules are enforced. The system protects children to a degree unimaginable to Chinese people.

Children are the most important part of our society, yet we live in a system that does not support their protection. On the mainland, the most important people are government officials. We remember the deadly fire at a concert hall in Karamay, Xinjiang, in 1994, where children were told to “sit still to let cadres escape first”. This despicable order was roundly denounced when it came to light, but, even now, officials enjoy far better protection than ordinary children in every way.

At the same time, an elderly person who collapses on the street in today’s mainland China can expect no help from passers-by. This indifference has become so widespread that authorities have issued guidelines on giving aid and orders that proclaim “helping others is not a crime”. But these have not worked; ordinary folk just want to stay out of trouble.

Mencius says we should care for the old and young as if they were our own family. This famous saying is found in our textbooks, and the sentiment it expresses makes us feel proud of our ancestors. It is also trotted out at all kinds of occasions, and a common variation is the saying that “Respect for the old and love for the young are traditional Chinese values”. It leads to the impression that Chinese people care more for their elderly and children than do people in other cultures.

This is something government propaganda wants us to believe. Officials want to convey the message that China has a unique culture, and Chinese people have values that have stood the test of time and are not easily changed. Thus, following this logic, the old and young in China are said to be protected in a way that those in other societies, especially Western ones, are not; China prizes familial ties, while, in the West, social relations are cold, familial bonds are weak and individual interests dominate.

The culture and character of every ethnic group is shaped by its own particular history. There was a time in China when the family was the basic unit of social and political order. It didn’t necessarily mean that the Chinese treasured familial ties any more than other people did; the family was just part of a political system to keep the young in line.

But government officials today hold up this fact as proof that Chinese people prefer such a system, and that China is not suited to a democratic and free society based on human rights. Look, they say, at how democracy brings social upheaval, how freedom has ruined familial bonds and how talk of human rights only fans selfishness. Only authoritarian societies like China’s can bring true harmony.

But, at the same time, officials also like to point out that ordinary people in China are not civilised enough to understand the concept of democratic freedoms, and therefore are not yet ready for a democracy. We’re told that one day, when the people are of a higher calibre, the authorities will naturally grant us democracy, freedom and rights.

When the wise in ancient China encouraged people to treat the young and old as we would our own family, many Western civilisations were still in their infancy. Today, making a slogan of this virtue only shows up the motive of government officials: a misguided attempt to demonstrate China’s cultural difference. After all, we can’t say it is promoting moral standards – the recurring tragic accidents tell us only that society is on the verge of moral collapse.

Similarly for the so-called lack of democratic maturity. If we allow government powers to expand unchecked, not only will we never see the day we become a civilised people, even more of our values will be lost.

Both morals and democracy don’t come with the switch of a button; they are learned through a process. Without people doing their part in a system of checks and balances, unrestrained powers will become a force of destruction. And this will be the opposite outcome of what we intend.

If there are still traditions left that we can be proud of, they are already slowly eroding. This is the problem that should worry us.

乌坎事件之所以发展到今天，首先不是政府创新了什么机制，而是民众改变了自己。最值得总结的，不是政府如何应对民众的群体事件，而是民众如何应对政府的维稳体系。

选举年中的意外事件

长平

很难想像，一个民主国家的领导人，会以疑惑且暗含责备的口吻问记者：你们为什么对选举感兴趣？但是广东省委书记汪洋这样问了：你们，为什么对乌坎事件这么有兴趣？

2012年被称为世界选举年，据CNN统计，全球有59个国家进行政府或议会大选。年初的台湾大选，年末的美国大选，俄罗斯总统易位，中国领导人交班，韩国、日本以及阿拉伯世界的政治风云，都早早地列入了各大小媒体的选题单。不过我相信，再细致的预案，也不会事先想到乌坎选举。

即便在乌坎事件发轫之初，媒体也普遍将其视为又一个被镇压的维权活动，而不是一场真正的民主选举。我和同事们也有些惊讶地发现，新创刊才出版了14期杂志的《阳光时务》，竟然用了5期封面故事来报道乌坎事件。因此，我也觉得很有必要向汪洋书记汇报一下，我们，为什么对乌坎事件这么有兴趣？

在我听来，汪洋书记的反问里同时包含了三层意思：你们是不是小题大作了？是不是别有用心？是不是发生了误会？第一个是媒体的新闻判断问题，与汪洋没有关系，但他可以善意提醒；第二个是中国官员惯用的伎俩，与其说是对外媒的诛心术，不如说是对国内民众的障眼法；第三个是他真正需要对媒体澄清的事情。

汪洋如是说：“我们经过初步了解以后，认为乌坎群众在土地等问题上的诉求既是合理的又是合法的，因此我们就是要代表人民群众的利益，……我实事求是地说一句话，乌坎的民主选举没有任何创新。”

在重要搭档王立军出入成都美国总领事馆之后，薄熙来大举创新的重庆模式成为政治笑话，北京已经基本控制局面，这个时候地方诸侯再大谈创新，对仕途没有好处，也许这是汪洋否认创新的真实原因。但是，我仍然认为他说了实话，官方在乌坎事件上并没有任何创新。

有一些学者和评论人始终睁大眼睛去发现官方的善举，随时准备予以大肆吹捧，以为夸一夸官员们就从善如流了。因此，乌坎事件刚有转机，村民们还没有从生死搏斗中缓过气来，他们就盛赞广东省委省政府开创了“乌坎模式”，称之为政府处理维权事件的新思维。这真是一个美丽的误会。

事实上，乌坎村民从个人上访到集体请愿，从迎来武警的警棍、盾牌和催泪弹到带头人被警方拘押，广东省各级政府在这个过程中的表现，完全是因袭自六四以来对付各种权利呼喊的镇压模式，没有任何创新可言。假如武警阻止了乌坎人的游行和抗议，假如带头人被抓之后村民就各自散去，假如政府从村民内部分化瓦解成功，乌坎事件就是若干年来发生的无数底层维权活动之一。就在乌坎事件发生之后，广东省各级政府也在以过去的方式，而不是所谓的“乌坎模式”镇压各种维权活动。

因此，从政府既有的思路看，乌坎村民从上访维权到民主选举，不过维稳体系中的一场意外事件。

那么这场意外事件能否改变政府思路和行为呢？如果能够，又将怎样改变？

汪洋认为乌坎群众在土地等问题上的诉求合理合法，而英明的政府洞若观火，主动顺应民心，所以就让他们把《组织法》和《村民委员会选举办法》落到实处。看来汪书记不打算在创新上让其他诸侯眼红，却要在守法上与乌坎村民争功。但是，他这个解释至少有三个疑点等待进一步的解释。

第一，不再像往常那样走过场，落实《组织法》和《村民委员会选举办法》的动力何在？是因为群众诉求合理合法吗？假如有群众提出不合理合法的诉求，政府就可以不给他们落实此二法？或者两者没有因果关系，是政府突然觉悟了吗？

第二，既然群众诉求合理合法，为什么在此前长时间的上访中政府没有慧眼识珠呢？直到上访被忽视被阻止之后出现激烈冲突，政府也没看一眼人家的诉求，就派出武警包围村庄了，并宣布村民自治组织非法？村民们誓死反抗致使武警不能进村，政府还没看出其诉求合理合法，派出流氓便衣去骗抓了带头人，并在看守所里发生人命案？那么政府到底是什么时候，何种情况下，突然发现这些诉求原来是合理合法的呢？

第三，这个说法是否意味着，过去、现在和将来，那些被镇压的维权活动，民众的诉求都不合理合法？或者说不合理不合法，就可以武力镇压？

很多学者都在讨论政府的创新和改变，虽然是出于各种好意，但 在我看来这多少是对乌坎民众的勇敢和智慧的忽视。乌坎事件之所以发展到今天，首先不是政府创新了什么机制，而是民众改变了自己。最值得总结的，不是政府如何应对民众的群体事件，而是民众如何应对政府的维稳体系。

首先，从土地征用到村官选举，乌坎人都有自己明确的权利意识。他们明白土地和自己的关系，也明白土地和腐败的关系，更明白腐败和选票的关系。尤其重要的是，他们在行动中不断地强化和丰富这种权利意识。

其次，他们坚持行动，多方出击。从传统的宗法制度，到时髦的微博平台，都可以成为他们追求民主的资源。在武警围村的恐惧中，他们能够誓死反抗；当官方同意谈判的时候，他们可以理性应对；争取到民主的机会之后，他们仔细谋划，反复讨论，创造性地发展了村民代表议会制度。

尤其重要的是，他们集思广益，善于学习，不断成长。无论男女，不管长幼，都能各擅其长，精诚合作。有钱的出钱，有力的出力，有智慧的出想法。同时，他们充分利用外部资源。选举专家，围观网民，都成为他们的合作伙伴。

当官方以惯用的敌我划分来隔离境外媒体时，他们未被吓倒，反而更多更好地为记者提供方便，让事件成为全球焦点，得享不仅透明而且杀菌的舆论阳光。而内地很多类似事件被镇压之后，人们却常常总结是因为外媒采访给了官方口实。

乌坎人的行动，的确也给了官方创新模式的机会。或者说，是他们的坚持，让官方被迫改变了陈旧的套路，寻求新的解决办法。但是，这并不等于官方从此获得并改用这一模式，来应对类似的群体事件。要让想“乌坎模式”成为这个庞大的官僚体系的“创新”，仍然需要民间社会给予足够大的压力，发展足够多的智慧。

Chang Ping says the very real fear in Hong Kong about the erosion of its
freedoms and values has been mistakenly cast as a debate on ‘Hongkongers vs
mainlanders’. In fact, many mainlanders are our allies in this fight

Feb 21, 2012

Soon after Wang Lijun’s dramatic visit to the US consulate in Chengdu , a
poster was circulated online with the tagline: “Security chief Wang, we’ve had
enough”, airing grouses such as: “I’ve sung off-key all my life, yet you forced
me to sing red songs.” Wang is, of course, the disgraced former vice-mayor of
Chongqing , and the poster was just one in a series of mainland-produced posters
that parodied the “Hongkongers have had enough” advertisement published in the

Apple Daily.

The “anti-locust” storm that erupted in Hong Kong over the Lunar New Year
holiday has subsided a little, but has not gone away. It will continue to rumble
in the run-up to the chief executive election next month, and the 15th
anniversary of the handover in July.

Hong Kong media has covered the debate extensively; the poster’s
discriminatory tone was widely pointed out, with some even calling it fascist.
In the mainland media, commentators have rightly noted that Hong Kong has
benefited from its ties with the mainland, relying on it for food, water and
electricity, and help to tide over economic crises.

Mainland students in Hong Kong have also pleaded for tolerance and
understanding; they said it was simplistic to see the cultural differences
simply as mainland people’s lack of suzhi, or quality (a term with
multiple meanings that refers to anything from education and manners to
essential nature).

By contrast, the series of posters ripping off the Hong Kong advert –
“Beijingers have had enough”, “Shanghainese have had enough”, “Chinese soccer
fans have had enough”, “Wuhan University has had enough”, to name a few – has
drawn far less comment. It’s interesting to note that all except one – “Mainland
Chinese have had enough” – were satirical and not meant to be taken seriously.

What frame of mind inspired these posters? If, say, Japanese right-wing
activists had produced a similar racially inflammatory ad, the Chinese online
community would not have laughed it off. So, instead of causing anger and hurt,
this strongly worded Hong Kong ad clearly resonated with mainland people.

Not all of the posters can be explained by the xenophobia at play in the
richer cities, in Hong Kong as in Beijing and Shanghai. But all are rooted in
the frustration and helplessness felt when government policies fail, and people
seek to blame outsiders for the harm they have suffered.

Sure, one internet survey found that 70per cent of mainlanders supported
Peking University’s Kong Qingdong’s rant calling Hongkongers dogs, but another
survey with a different sample would easily have produced a totally different
outcome.

Some Hong Kong scholars have spread generalisations that mainland people are
steeped in the values of an authoritarian system; this is unfair and misleading.
Hongkongers are understandably upset when the arrival of pregnant mainland women
causes a shortage of hospital beds, and when mainland tourists flout local
rules. But to see the problem as a looting of resources by mainlanders or a mere
cultural clash is to underestimate Hong Kong’s true value.

Mainland families who go to Hong Kong to give birth are mostly from the
middle or middle-upper class. They are the winners in an unjust mainland system
that looks after its privileged classes, and they are unlikely to be eyeing Hong
Kong’s welfare benefits.

What they’re after is an identity card that accords them some protection of
democratic freedoms and the rule of law. People with the means to do so seek
this protection in the US, Europe and Australia, including those who got rich
through corruption. There are corrupt people everywhere, including in the US and
Hong Kong. But not one of them would seek a mainland identity card, because even
the corrupt want a sense of security.

Mainland people understand better than Hongkongers what “enough is enough”
means. A public opinion survey found that only a minority of Hongkongers
preferred to identify themselves as Chinese citizens. Perhaps even more so,
mainland people, too, would rather not identify themselves as Chinese; just ask
those mainland families who go to Hong Kong to give birth.

Mainland Chinese with no means to go to Hong Kong to give birth, or even
visit as a tourist, actually would not mind being a “locust”, because this would
be a step up for them. Ironically, being called a potential locust gives them
hope for the future. “Enough is enough” is a cry that resonates with mainland
people. They can’t buy advertising space in a newspaper to voice this feeling,
so they create satirical posters and circulate them online.

The Hong Kong government now looks likely to further curb the entry of
pregnant mainland women and immigration. This is one consequence of the
“anti-locust” movement.

But Hongkongers risk misunderstanding the problem if they see it as an issue
of “Hongkongers v mainlanders”, as the ad suggests. Many of them in fact have
intimated that the true threat to Hong Kong is the encroachment of the cultural
values, business practices and lifestyle habits produced by a particular
political system on the mainland.

How it happens, though, is unlikely to be the long-term process that many
Hongkongers imagine: mainland children born here and brainwashed by mainland
education will one day return to Hong Kong, gradually changing the character of
the city; or, the erosion of values will come through the influx of mainland
immigrants. The authorities don’t have the foresight or the patience for such a
long campaign of “infiltration”.

This encroachment is already happening on a daily level – the influx of
capital that effects changes in the cultural and media environment; the
political campaigns that ensure pro-establishment parties gain more votes and
influence; the ban on travel to Hong Kong of mainland people who hold dissenting
opinions. This kind of insidious influence cannot be so easily turned away.
Regrettably, these issues have not received the attention they deserve in the
debate on the “anti-locust” campaign.

In the protection of Hong Kong values, Hongkongers should see that many
mainland people, including those who go to Hong Kong to give birth, are not
their enemies but their allies. This is because all of us have had enough.

本文原发表于《阳光时务》第13期，现有部分字句改动。

改革就是革命
――后南巡时代的中国政改

长平

辞旧迎新的改革希望

虽然现实未有多少改变，但是希望从来也没有远离，这个春天尤其令人浮想联翩。

首先是邓小平南巡20周年，人们像当年一样渴望沉闷中的一声惊雷。这声惊雷原本期待
在九年前“胡温新政”伊始响起，却被代之以“和谐社会”，改革的空间不长反消。然而，当人们在不久前听到总理温家宝谈到“今年是本届政府任期的最后一年”，“能做的事情绝不拖延，能解决的问题绝不推脱”时，再一次心潮澎湃地，准备原谅九年苦等，对胡温政权的尾声寄予厚望。

其次，继近两年频繁谈论政改之后，温家宝今春再次成为话题明星：首次正面回应阿拉伯之春，称“要尊重各国人民要求变革和维护自身利益的诉求”，“任何政府的责任都是为人民谋利益，除了这一点以外，它不应该有任何特权”。他还借南巡纪念之机，重提邓小平讲话：“不改革开放只能死路一条”。而且，在乌坎村民通过顽强抗争实现民主选举之际，他要求保障农民的选举权利，强调“没有程序的民主，就没有实质的民主”。

再次，打黑唱红之都的英雄，重庆市副市长王立军戏剧性地从成都美国总领馆被押送到北京，让“重庆模式”的前途和中共十八大的人事暗战成为全世界的政治八卦。而《人民日报》刊发题为《宁要微词，不要危机》的文章，大谈“冒风险也要改革”，因为“改革有风险，但不改革党就会有危险”，被认为是这个八卦的严肃注脚，意味着高层已达成改革共识，十八大之后的新“新政”更值得期待。

至少人民还有期待的自由，任何希望和幻想都值得体谅和尊重。同时为了不让希望再次被“和谐”，不让生命被耗费又一个九年，我们也不妨趁此机会，讨论几个问题。

政治改革必须有死路一条

《人民日报》文章坦率地说，中国的改革改到如今，“容易的都改得差不多了，剩下的全是难啃的‘硬骨头’。”它没有直接说透”硬骨头”所指何物，但我相信在大多数读者的理解中，都是指政治改革。

准确地说，并非经济体制改革“改得差不多了”，而是在金融，财税，地产，国企等等各个领域都问题成堆，甚至不进反退，危机四伏。然而，所有的经济问题都碰触到政治的暗礁。正如邓小平一再表述，温家宝一再重述的那样，没有政治体制改革，经济体制改革无法深入，而且成果难保。

由于共产主义意识形态作为执政思想在全球的破产，中共在改革开放以后把经济发展作为事实上的合法基础。经济体制改革的成果不保，也就意味着中共的统治危机。因此，邓小平和温家宝在谈及深化改革时，都是以一种大声疾呼的语气进行警告：“国家需要改革开放，人民需要改革开放，谁不改革谁下台！对，不改革开放就下台！下台！”，“一个党，一个国家，一个民族，如果一切从本本出发，思想僵化，迷信盛行，那它就不能前进，它的生机就停止了，就要亡党亡国”，以及“邓小平表示，要坚持改革开放不动摇，不改革开放只能是死路一条。”

中国内地主张政治改革的媒体及民间舆论，也总是一再借“亡党亡国”相威胁。他们不知道的是，“久经考验”的中共高级官僚，再也不会有谁会被这些话吓倒。邓小平也仅仅以这些警告推动了经济改革，其他人想要靠它启动政治改革，让人想起经济学家于光远说过的一句话:“要共产党搞政治体制改革，等于与虎谋皮。”

就个人的政治利益而言，历史清楚地告诉人们，不消说极权专制的毛泽东时代，即便是在三十年改革开放时期，事实并非“谁不改革谁下台”，而是恰恰相反，谁改革谁下台――被认为在政改方面不思进取的江泽民、胡锦涛，甚至保守反动的李鹏等中共领导人，都能得以善终，而锐意改革的胡耀邦，赵紫阳，则成为悲剧性的政治人物。

这并非是历史的偶然。从一个想要永远把持统治权力，视任何挑战权威的民间努力为敌对势力的政治集团的利益来说，政治改革并不会带来任何好处，甚至就是死路一条――至少对于既有的依靠腐败专制的获利者来说，必须是死路一条。

把“长治久安”作为改革的前提，那就不可能是真正的政治改革。即便按照邓小平及其他中共领导的论述，政治改革也意味着更多的民主。民主就意味着挑战，意味着公平的竞争，意味着一切皆有可能。

一个腐败专制的政治利益集团，经过改造以后是否能够新生？当然有这个可能。苏联和东欧的共产党，台湾的国民党都是如此。然而，把拒绝统治权力的挑战作为新生的前提，在全世界都还没有先例。

胡耀邦之子胡德华在接受采访时指出，邓小平与胡耀邦改革动机的区别在于，前者是为了救党，后者是为了救民。救党者权杖在握，救民者黯然下台。要么胡德华的说法不成立，要么政党利益和人民利益并不像政治宣传中号称的那样始终一致，而且前者大大凌驾于后者之上。

当《人民日报》再次以“救党”的立意谈论深化改革的时候，我们有必要认真思考这一问题：政治改革到底是为了什么，救党还是救民？假如二者发生冲突，应该如何取舍？救党的改革在何种前提下才有可能？

政治改革就是民主革命

改革与革命的新争论，自去年辛亥革命百年纪念开始，至今余波未了。

很多人都认为区分改革与革命至关重要，但是很少有人作出清晰的论证。甚至用暴力来区别，也遇到了这样的难题：戊戌变法磨刀霍霍，六四民运血染广场，反右和文革死伤无数，辛亥革命却并未爆发大规模流血冲突，更不用说和平的天鹅绒革命了。

这些争论者似乎都不知道，邓小平很早就断言：改革就是革命。

从1978年开始，邓小平一再宣称：“实现四个现代化是一场深刻的伟大的革命”，“必然要多方面地改变生产关系，改变上层建筑”；“精简机构是一场革命”；“这几年进行的农村的改革，是一种带革命意义的改革”；“我们把改革当作一种革命”；“改革是中国的第二次革命”；“改革的性质同过去的革命一样，也是为了扫除发展社会生产力的障碍，使中国摆脱贫穷落后的状态。从这个意义上说，改革也可以叫革命性的变革。”

在1992年的南巡谈话中，邓小平同样强调说，革命是解放生产力，改革也是解放生产力，因此改革就是革命。

这并非因为邓小平作为职业革命家偏爱“革命”一词，而是他比当下很多人更明白改革的意思。真正的改革跟革命是一回事，就是要进行性质上的实质性改变。政治改革就是民主革命，民主革命就意味着权力竞争，专制不再。

正如戈尔巴乔夫所说：“改革是一个含义很多、容量极大的字眼。但是，如果要从它的许多同义词中找出一个最能表达它的本质的关键词，那么可以说，改革就是革命。”

正因为如此，邓小平从来没有下定决心进行真正的政治改革。他的确多次强调政治改革的重要意义，他的“不改革就是死路一条”至今被认为也包含了政治改革。然而，当他把坚持“四项基本原则（第一，必须坚持社会主义道路；第二，必须坚持无产阶级专政；第三，必须坚持共产党的领导；第四，必须坚持马列主义、毛泽东思想）”作为改革的前提时，所谓政治体制改革就没有任何革命性质，甚至是一个文字游戏了。

赵紫阳在他的回忆录中说：“邓对现行政治体制的运行，他是有不满意的地方，主张改革也是真实的。但他心目中的改革，并不是真正的政治上的现代化、民主 化。主要的是一种行政改革，属于具体的工作制度、组织制度、工作方法、工作作风方面的改革。邓主张的是在坚持共产党一党专政前提下的改革，改革正是为了进 一步地巩固共产党的一党专政。任何影响和削弱共产党一党专政的改革，都是邓坚决拒绝的。”

杨继绳在《中国改革年代的政治斗争》一书中说：“邓小平阵线和陈云阵线有两点共识:一是坚持中国原有的政治制度和指导思想不能改变;二是必须改变毛泽东留下的经济现状,即经济体制改革。”并认为南巡谈话强化和固定了市场经济加权威政治的模式。邓小平在南巡讲话中强调:“在整个改革开放过程中,必须始终注意坚持四项基本原则。十二届六中全会我提出反对资产阶级自由化还要搞 20 年，现在看起来，还不只 20 年。”

当下中国经济发展，政治滞后，造成官员滥权，腐败丛生，法治倒退。这些现象的出现，并非像有些主张改革的人士所抱怨的那样，是因为中共领导人没有遵循邓小平理论思想。事实上，这正是他们严格执行邓小平路线的结果。

重庆模式和广东模式，并没有人们想像中那么大的差异，都是不同版本的邓小平模式，也就是让全世界受到困扰的中国模式。

没有共识才有变革

很多有志于推进改革的人士，虽然了解邓小平改革思想的矛盾之处，但是他们故意视而不见，而且把彻底的政治改革的愿望强加到邓小平的头上，希望借助这位已逝领袖的余威，说服民众，施压中央，从而达成全社会的改革共识。他们以为有了改革共识，一切都会迎刃而解。

这些借南巡纪念而寻求改革共识的人们忽略了基本的历史事实，那就是当年如果形成了改革共识，就不会有南巡这件事情了。此前，邓小平试图通过上海《解放日报》发表的署名“皇甫平”的系列文章制造舆论。据作者之一周瑞金回忆说，这些文章遭到来自北京长达一年左右的批判，由此可见分歧与斗争之严重。

由此上溯至上世纪七十年代，是否因为全社会形成了改革的共识，随后改革就发生了呢？当时的大多数民众，和权力中心根本信息不对称，没有任何可能去和斗得你死我活的当权者达成共识。安徽小岗村的村民，也不是因为要和别的什么人达成改革共识，才立下“生死状”，在土地承包责任书上按下红手印。

在一个政治资源被统治者彻底控制的社会，假如说统治者内部达成某种共识尚有可能的话，那么民间社会根本没有渠道也没有资格去寻求这样的共识。

尤其是一方要追求民主政治，一方要把专制作为前提时，共识只会是一个谎言。

当人们津津乐道于上世纪八十年代的“改革共识”时，他们俨然忘记了八九民运的存在。统治者不惜以坦克和枪炮来对准示威民众，足见“共识”之虚幻。

更重要的是，这样的共识本身没有必要。

人类历史上的变革，很少是因为共识而发生，更多恰好是冲突的结果。

今天广东的乌坎，就是当年安徽的小岗村。正如小岗村人争取到经济权利一样，乌坎人争取到了自己的政治权利。乌坎人也曾试图通过上访去和当局达成改革的共识，然而并未如愿。最后，他们和当年的小岗村人一样，冒着生命危险，捍卫自己的基本权利，终于获得成功，载入中国改革的史册。

尤其要警惕的是，在很大程度上，形成共识是统一思想的另外一种表述。统一思想只会限制自由，而不能促成改革，尤其不能促成包含思想自由的政治改革。

与其寻求全社会的改革共识，不如鼓励每一个人都了解自己的权利。

与其徒劳地把希望放在一代又一代的领导人身上，不如一点一点地积聚公民社会哪怕微薄的力量。

无论即将卸任的胡温政权如何满足你九年前的期望，也无论即将履职的新一代领导人如何大刀阔斧，你都不必沉浸于改革共识的虚幻图景，而是始终清醒地意识到你作为个体的存在，尽最大可能去做自己想做的事情。

多元存在乃是文明进步之本,冲突和压力才会带来改革，激烈冲突和强大压力才有可能促成一个享受专制盛宴的利益集团进行政治改革。

Source: http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=1da68cdb703d5310VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=China&s=News
(ok)

Wrong route

Chang Ping says the growing ranks of people in China calling for a
return to Deng Xiaoping’s road map for political reform fail to see that China
never left it; they misunderstand Deng’s intention

Updated on Mar 03, 2012

To mark the 20th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, both Xinhua
and the People’s Daily published commentaries to push for reforms. Xinhua
said if China wants to keep writing its “Story of Spring”, it must deepen its
reform efforts, including changing the government’s roles and functions. And the
People’s Daily rallied the country to press on: “Reforms carry risks, but
the party would be in danger without reform.”

Premier Wen Jiabao himself affirmed Deng’s call for reform, warning on a
visit to Guangdong last month that the country would “come to a dead end without
reform and opening up”. He said Deng’s words were still of great relevance today
and should continue to guide China.

Neither the articles nor Wen made mention specifically of political reform,
but many people understood their remarks to mean that. China’s economic
development is increasingly mired in the quicksand of Chinese politics, and its
many social problems cannot be solved without political development. The
rallying cry for reform from the top ranks of China’s political hierarchy have
made people hopeful and excited.

Deng had so often spoken up for political reform that people believe Chinese
politics would be very different today if he were still alive. So, they reason,
China’s most urgent task is to return to Deng’s road map for reform.

This is bizarre thinking, because China has never veered off course. For a
start, Deng hand-picked the two men who succeeded him. But, more importantly,
the problems we see now in China – the unbalanced and distorted development,
rampant corruption, a wide income gap and deterioration of human rights
protection – are all by-products of Deng’s reform.

The Chinese model of economic development first caught international
attention in 2004, when American scholar Joshua Cooper Ramo published a paper on
“The Beijing Consensus”. Since then, many Chinese scholars have praised the
model as being eminently suitable for China; some even say today it could save a
global economy in crisis. Before long, some historians of the Communist Party
pointed out that the credit for such a good development model belonged not to
Ramo but to Deng, who in fact proposed the idea a long time ago and had put it
into practice.

Starting from the early 1980s, Deng had indeed spoken often of China’s need
to forge its own pathway for development. His description of the strategy is by
now well-known: Chinese development must have one central task (economic
development) and two basic points (adherence to reform and opening up, and
adherence to the four cardinal principles).

Deng’s four principles called on the Chinese people to uphold the socialist
path; the people’s democratic dictatorship; the leadership of the Communist
Party; and Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thought.

In championing his policy of reform and opening up, Deng repeatedly stressed
the importance of adhering to these four principles. During the southern tour of
two decades ago, he said care must be taken during the course of reform that the
four principles were upheld. He said then that efforts to oppose the
“liberalisation of capitalism” would take longer than expected. “At the sixth
plenary session of the 12th Central Committee, I objected to the estimation that
such a process should take 20 years. I think now it would take more than 20
years,” he said.

What exactly is the “liberalisation of capitalism”? Deng defined it as “the
worship of Western capitalist societies’ notions of democracy and freedom, and
the rejection of socialism”. He was right; 20 years on, China continues to
oppose democratic freedoms.

Deng’s ideal model is a marriage of economic liberalisation and political
authoritarianism. Author and former Xinhua journalist Yang Jisheng said Deng’s
landmark speeches in the south cemented the Chinese development model, which
more precisely should be called the Deng Xiaoping model.

What kind of political reform did Deng have in mind then? Zhao Ziyang wrote
in his memoir that it had little to do with reform in the sense of modernisation
and democratisation. Rather, Zhao said, Deng was mainly concerned with
administrative reforms, with changing the workflow, organisational structure and
work methodology. Zhao said Deng’s idea of political reform rested on the
premise of single-party rule by the party, and reform was meant only to
strengthen it. In his conversations, Deng spoke often of social stability and
“the party’s career”, but rarely of dignity and rights.

The leaders after Deng have strictly followed Deng’s path. And the result is
rampant abuse of power by officials, widespread corruption and receding rule of
law. What a joke then that today so many are calling for a return to Deng’s way
to solve these problems.

For two years now, Wen has cited Deng’s words to urge reforms. But he has
never outlined the specifics of his plan. The reason is, if he were to follow
Deng’s line of thought, we’d see there is no real political reform to speak of.
If Wen were to unveil a reform plan based on democratic values it would violate
Deng’s cardinal principles and, hence, his development model.

But even the government is now aware that China’s development has brought
many problems, as the commentaries in Xinhua and the People’s Daily made
clear. The time of prosperity and plenty that some scholars say China is now
enjoying does not accord with reality.

For true political reform, we should reflect on the shortcomings of Deng’s
development model. Following his road map for reform won’t take us there.

Chang Ping is a current affairs commentator writing on politics, society
and culture. This commentary is translated from Chinese

重庆市副市长王立军戏剧性地进入美国驻成都总领事馆之后，有网民制作海报《王提督，忍够了》：“我天生就是音盲，有些人还要逼我唱红歌……我要去美国，一个没有红歌的地方。”内地网络出现无数戏仿香港《苹果日报》那则义愤填膺的广告《香港人，忍够了》的恶搞海报，这只是其中的一款。

新年伊始，香港爆发一场“反蝗”争论，尽管硝烟渐落，但是暗云未散，大有可能在特首选战和回归十五周年纪念中卷土重来。在香港舆论连篇累牍的讨论中，该广告的种族歧视倾向也成为焦点，甚至被称为法西斯主义观念。

香港人从本地媒体，可以看到内地民众的正面反驳，比如声称内地的水电和粮食养活了香港人，内地资金扶助香港度过经济危机等等；也可以看到赴港求学的内地学生和一些新移民的小心翼翼的辩解，比如文化差异不能简单地说成素质低，不同的生活习惯应该得到体谅包容等等。但是香港舆论忽略了网络上为数众多并被广为传播的戏仿广告，比如“北京人，忍够了”，“中国球迷，忍够了”，“武汉大学，忍够了”等等。除了一款“中国人，忍够了”是严肃的反驳之外，其余都是幽默讽刺，借题发挥式改写。

这是一种什么样的心态？试想假如日本右翼做出类似的种族污名广告，中国网民断然不会如此轻松对待。这说明这则激烈的广告并没有在内地民众中造成普遍的伤害和愤怒，反而引起了某种共鸣。尽管有某网站调查七成网民支持骂香港人是狗的北京大学教授孔庆东，但是这显然是不合理的采样。假如换一个网站调查，结果可能完全颠倒过来。

有一些共鸣并不具备与香港人的怨气同样的基础，比如因为不平等政策而享受特权的北京，上海等城市的排外情绪。但是它们都犯有共同的错误，那就是把政府决策失当的结果，以及被权势者掠夺的失落感，归咎于外来合法谋生者。

有香港有学者把内地人统称为“信仰专制制度者”，这显然不符合事实并且误导香港民众，使他们看不到问题的真相。内地孕妇固然让香港的床位紧张，内地游客不懂规则当然让香港人烦恼，但是“资源抢夺论”和“文化冲突论”夸大了表面差异，看低了香港价值。

来香港产子的孕妇，大多来自内地中产以上家庭。由于内地的不平等更甚，既得利益者更容易享受特权，这些家庭既不会来申请“综援”，也未必挂念着未来的福利。他们更在意的，是一种包含着自由，民主和法治的身份。很多更有能力的人，是去更自由民主的欧美澳洲寻求这个身份。其中不乏贪腐分子换取身份躲避法律的惩罚，但是香港或美国的贪腐分子为什么不换成中国身份呢？法治社会的安全感，对贪腐者和无辜者都一样重要。

所有千方百计摆脱中国内地身份的人，比大多香港人更知道什么叫“忍够了”。民意调查显示只有不到两成香港人认同自己是”中国人“，赴港产子的家庭恐怕更不喜欢自己的中国人身份。对于那些并不赴港产子，甚至没有机会赴港旅游的中国民众来说，很多人并不介意自己是潜在的”蝗虫“――这也许反倒会给他们增添一些未来的希望，因为他们自己经常称自己是”屁民“，比”蝗虫“更没有价值感。因此，”忍够了“更是他们的心声。不能像香港人那样一本正经地到报纸上去登广告，他们就通过互联网上的恶搞来发泄。

香港政府已收紧对内地孕妇入港的审查，甚至可能修改新移民政策，算是”反蝗“运动的成果。但是，如果香港人真的以为，像那则广告上所说，这是一场香港人和内地人的冲突，那真是天大的误会。很多香港人都意识到了，香港面临的真正威胁，来自内地的政治制度所培养的文化教育，商业伦理和生活习惯对香港价值的侵蚀。

但是，并不像有些香港人想像的那样，这些侵蚀要通过漫长过程来实现――孕妇赴港产子，孩子到内地受洗脑教育，长大以后回到香港，改变香港的颜色；或者让拿单程证入港的新移民都肩负秘密使命。内地权势阶层没有那么长远的眼光，也没有那份耐心。侵蚀每天都在以更直接的方式发生，比如通过资本侵入，影响传媒及文化产业；通过政治运作，让建制派获取更多的选票；通过直接指令，阻止内地异议人士到香港工作或旅游。而这些侵蚀，并不是香港人闭关死守就可以拒之门外的。遗憾的是，这些问题在“反蝗”运动中没有得到深入讨论。

香港人应该了解，对于守住香港价值而言，很多中国内地人包括赴港生子的父母，并不是你们的敌人，而是同盟军，因为大家都“忍够了”。

Ian
Johnson

This is the fourth in an NYRblog series about the fate of democracy in
different parts of the world.

Ian Johnson

Chang Ping

Chang Ping is one of China’s best-known commentators on contemporary affairs.
Chang, whose real name is Zhang Ping, first established himself in the late
1990s in Guangzhou, where his hard-hitting stories exposed scandals and
championed freedom of expression. As censorship has tightened in recent years,
Chang’s pleas for openness and accountability have put him under pressure. The
43-year-old is currently living with his wife and daughter in Germany at the
former country home of the Nobel Prize winner Heinrich Böll, which has been
converted into a refuge
for persecuted writers.

Chang’s travails began in 2001, when he was removed as news director
ofSouthern Weekend, then a daring weekly that had won readers across
the country. He became deputy editor of Southern Metropolis Weekly, but
was removed in 2008, and subsequently banned from print, after publishing an editorial questioning government
censorship of that year’s Tibetan uprising. One year ago, he was finally fired
by the newspaper, with an editor saying his work was “inappropriate.”Last
March, Chang joined a newly launched Hong Kong-based magazine, iSun Affairs, as chief editor but was denied
a visa and has not been allowed into the former British colony.

Ian Johnson: You grew up in the 1970s; did you
experience anything of the Cultural Revolution?

Chang Ping: My father was a low-level official in our
hometown in Xichong County (in rural Sichuan) and got caught up in the
factionalism of the Cultural Revolution. When I was young I attended an
elementary school that was located on the side of the road. If you entered or
left the village you passed it. I remember one day he was standing outside the
window looking in at me. That afternoon I went home and said to my mother: “Dad
was very strange. Dad was outside the school window staring at me.” My mother
started crying and said, “Dad has gone and we don’t know if he’ll ever return
again.” He had fled to a neighboring county to escape violence. We couldn’t
visit him but we would get letters from him and my mother would read them to us.
I was about eight years old.

Soon after this, reform and opening up started. We studied the Four
Modernizations (a project to develop the fields of agriculture, industry,
defense, and research and development) and were told that they would be realized
by 2000. We wrote so many essays about how to achieve the Four Modernizations. I
remember very clearly in 1984, at the 35th anniversary of the founding of the
People’s Republic, how the students at Peking University said “Hello Xiaoping!”
to Deng Xiaoping when he drove by at a rally. It was on the radio and I was
really moved. I thought: China has got such hope, such a bright future.

So you thought everything was great. You heard about the developments in
Beijing and were excited.

Yes and I was doing well in school too. When you’re personally successful,
you tend to think that things are going well. You’re optimistic. I thought
things were going well but in some ways I was an angry youth. There’s no
contradiction there. You believe, but you want to improve things. During the
1986 student movement, people like Liu Binyan, Fang Lizhi, and Wang Ruowang
criticized the party and Deng Xiaoping. I remember hearing about it on the radio
and felt in my heart that they were heroes.

At the time I loved literature. In the 1980s, literature was at a peak. I
subscribed to a lot of magazines like Harvest and People’s
Literature. I remember reading Mo Yan’s Red Sorghum and thinking,
Wow, someone can write like that. I remember vividly that I was sitting outside
and was so moved by that story. I didn’t quite understand everything but was
influenced by it. Also Yu Hua’s short stories, for example. But you know that at
that time I was still a complete believer. The books I wanted to read the most
were the original works of Marx and Engels. I wanted to learn German to read
them.

I went to college in 1987. Until then I’d been reading the classics of world
literature, and contemporary Chinese fiction. But then at Sichuan University (in
Chengdu) I read a series of books called Moving Toward the
Future (走向未来丛书). It was an edited series introducing the great thinkers in
other fields. This was a start for me and afterwards I read a lot of western
literature, philosophy, and history. The series was really influential in the
1980s and if you look at the editorial staff, they all suffered after June 4
(the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre). I guess from today’s point of view you’d
say they had intellectual property rights problems—they just translated or
cribbed from foreign publications. But for us it opened a world of psychology,
sociology, and literature. One book I have to mention is A Theory of
Justice by John Rawls. We’d just read these books so fast and share them.
Everyone was fascinated by Western philosophy especially. It didn’t matter what
your major was, you were interested in Western philosophy, like Heidegger or
Sartre.

How did you experience June 4? In Chengdu, you were quite far away from
Beijing, the center of it.

A lot was going on in Chengdu. We had protests all the time. People came from
Beijing with news and we’d put them up in our dorm rooms and share their
information. There were dialogues and demands to negotiate with the government.
I helped organize protests.

But I didn’t really join the main student protest committee. Ever since high
school I made one of Confucius’s sayings my motto: “The superior man is
dignified, but does not wrangle. He is sociable but not a partisan.” So I did
not want to join any movement. In high school I was in the Communist Youth
League and wanted to leave. They said, you can’t leave; there is no mechanism to
leave. But I didn’t join the party. I didn’t want to be a member of anything, so
in 1989 I wasn’t in the student committees. Still, I organized protests and was
seen as a leader. I got arrested after June 4. However, during the protests many
students had been on a hunger strike and I had opposed that. For that I think
they let me out of jail earlier. I think some students opposed me for opposing
the hunger strike but that was my view: a hunger strike was pointless. I thought
it was good to propagate democracy in factories and in the countryside.

So you’re a pragmatist?

Actually, many people think I’m more of an idealist. I still think China
needs democracy, that it needs to change. I really oppose several arguments
[that are commonly made] about why China can’t have democracy, such as the
argument that China is unique—that Chinese people need to wait because their
“quality” [a Chinese term, suzhi, that implies everything from educational level
to manners] isn’t high enough and other ridiculous things like that. Some people
said that democracy wasn’t part of Chinese culture, and then Taiwan became
democratic. Then they said that Taiwan was a special case. Now look at Wukan.
They had their own elections. People say it’s special, but in fact Wukan is
really typically Chinese. It’s a Chinese town but they organized everything. So
what argument are you left with? If Wukan can have democracy so can other parts
of China.

I’m not saying that China should have western-style democracy. In fact,
there’s not a single western model. What do they mean? Germany didn’t copy
America and America didn’t copy Britain. The issue isn’t copying. It’s do you or
don’t you want democracy? Of course democracy has a lot of problems but it’s a
way forward.

Since the 1980s, Chinese have been pragmatic. The question since the Cultural
Revolution has been: can it work? This was Deng Xiaoping’s biggest influence on
Chinese people. They ask if it’ll work or not. Now China has the world’s
second-largest economy and could overtake the US. So in terms of market
economics it’s been successful and I support this. What we lack is justice.
There is no justice in the current system. It’s a practical issue. We need
justice. Democracy is a way to bring justice. This is why democracy is
necessary.

The government doesn’t discuss rule of law much anymore. It’s become more and
more a hooligan way of ruling. They just arrest people and throw them in jail or
mental asylums. So the past decade has seen a hooliganization of the political
system. Many of the old virtues are destroyed by this. The virtues of humanism,
responsibilities of the government—the bottom line is things are disappearing.
That’s why we’ve had these terrible events of recent years, like Yue Yue.

Yue Yue is the little girl who was run over by a van and no one stopped to help
her. One recourse to this perceived spiritual vacuum has been that people
are getting more and more interested in religion.

Many are interested in it. Scholars hope that this will help develop more
virtues in society or provide some moral guidelines. There is a spiritual
vacuum. I really respect religion, but I believe in the special importance of
democracy, civic spirit, and freedom in politics, society, and culture for
solving the spiritual crisis.

What about your new magazine?

It’s run by iSun Cable Television from Hong Kong. Right now we’re a new media
organization. We offer on iPad, Android and are planning a Kindle version too.
You can also get copies as a pdf. But we are going to print too. We have a staff
of twenty. We have 6,000 subscribers on iPad, mostly on the mainland. We also
have more than 10,000 who get it as an email. We’ve been able to report on taboo
topics in China, such as [jailed Nobel Peace Prize winner] Liu Xiaobo, press
controls, and the trend of independent candidates running for office.

Obviously the authorities knew about the project before it started. You
haven’t been able to get a visa since you applied last March and Reporters
Without Borders sent an open
letter to Donald Tsang, chief executive of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.

According to the Hong Kong authorities’ own rules they should have
answered my application within a month, but they haven’t approved or rejected
the application. It’s already been nine months, so this is why people are
talking about influence from the mainland.

The magazine was one of the first to cover several recent key political
events, like the Wukan uprising. You have had by far the most comprehensive
coverage of it. But you also have much on culture. Over the past year cultural
figures in China have become embroiled in politics. How do you see the role of
people like the artist Ai Weiwei?

The original work of the popular and famous artists was all political—many of
them were influenced by people like Andy Warhol. They dealt with issues in
society. But after a while when they sold so much that they became super rich
and didn’t care much for social issues. To be honest, they just repeated
themselves a lot. I have respect for Ai Weiwei because he is concerned with
society. He is involved and engaged. It’s not his fault that he’s become more
and more popular in the West. It’s the same with Liu Xiaobo or Vaclav Havel.
This criticism isn’t fair.

What about the writer Han Han’s recent blogposts arguing
that democracy may not be well suited to Chinese people? This seems to echo some
of the other critics who say that China isn’t read for democracy.

He mentions that people have a “low quality” and that democracy could become
a problem because it could lead to violence. This is a view the government has
propagated for a long time. It’s like saying you can’t practice swimming until
you can swim and you can’t swim because you can’t practice. Also, the arguments
aren’t new. Many were made publicly last year, around the time of the centenary
of the 1911 revolution.

But he influences a lot of people so his bringing it up is interesting. It
shows how restricted China’s political system is. I think that what we’re seeing
is the loss of hope by a lot of people in change taking place, so they’re making
excuses about why it can’t happen. The decline in morals has lead to an increase
in violence—violence against opponents, protesters, and others—not because we’re
having a revolution but because we are not.

January 27, 2012, 1:45 p.m.

存档：《乌坎人，历史的浮雕》意大利文翻译。

La gente di Wukan, bassorilievo sulla storia

Autore: Chang Ping (长平)
Articolo Originale: 乌坎人，历史的浮雕

Dopo aver ripercorso le vicende del 2011, Chang Ping racconta la protesta
di Wukan esplorandone il significato nuovo che assume nella storia delle
proteste contadine in Cina. Chang Ping smentisce alcuni pregiudizi per cui i
cinesi non sono fatti per la democrazia. L’articolo è stato pubblicato su iSun
Affairs il 23 dicembre 2011.

Gente di Wukan. Gente di Wukan.
Devo sforzarmi per non far diventare
questo testo una poesia lirica.
Gente di Wukan. Gente di Wukan.
Meritate
le lodi di tutti i cinesi, ma spero che il vostro nome non diventi una leggenda.

Frotte di polizia e agenti in borghese, pressati all’ingresso del McDonald’s
di Wangfujing. Così è iniziato il 2011.
Mentre sbocciavano gelsomini nel
mondo arabo, l’attitudine risoluta del governo cinese nei confronti di
rivoluzionari pieni di speranza continua a fare affidamento alla forza armata
per mantenere l’autorità. È l’immagine simbolica della cruda interferenza nella
vita della gente comune.
Quindi l’arresto di Ran Yunfei, la scomparsa di Ai
Weiwei, gli avvocati dei weiquan (1) messi a tacere. Linyi, villaggio
dello Shandong dove abita Chen Guangcheng è diventato un antro oscuro noto in
tutto il mondo, dove i visitatori vengono colpiti e derubati, mentre il governo
spende soldi per tramutare gli abitanti del villaggio in farabutti.
[…] I
netizen hanno reso Weibo l’ancora di salvezza dell’opinione pubblica, la
saggezza popolare è venuta fuori, ma l’atteggiamento (restrittivo) del governo
si è rafforzato colpendo i siti commerciali. […]
L’economia cinese, prima
sostenuta come salvatrice della crisi economica mondiale, all’improvviso si è
indebolita. Il mercato della proprietà immobiliare ha barcollato sul filo
tremolante di Weibo, e la finanza da tempo fluttua come un cadavere per il
paese. Le aziende di proprietà statale indulgono nella baldoria del monopolio,
mentre restano ardui i mezzi di sussistenza di piccole e medie imprese. Agli
utenti di Weibo viene richiesto il vero nome per esprimersi, mentre le proprietà
dei funzionari non possono essere rese pubbliche. […]
L’improvvisa comparsa
di candidati indipendenti in elezioni a livello locale ha fatto rinascere il
sogno di un cambiamento del sistema. Il governo ha abbandonato anche i fronzoli
tollerati sotto il potere per più di dieci anni, colpendo apertamente i
candidati indipendenti.
Proteste e segnali di fumo ovunque. […]

La situazione è troppo complicata, la realtà troppo brutale. Così
dicono i cinesi. Alla fine dell’anno, fortunatamente, vediamo la gente di
Wukan.
Hanno reso tutto così semplice. Hanno usato l’azione per
screditare innumerevoli menzogne, aprendo un nuovo capitolo della politica
democratica cinese.
La fine del 2011 diventa un nuovo inizio.
Il grido
della gente di Wukan è simile a quello di numerosi cinesi, che per anni si sono
opposti alla corruzione dei livelli base. Il segretario del Partito del
villaggio, in carica per quarant’anni, ha seguito le regole di potere e le
pratiche cinesi, affidandosi al dispotismo e alla corruzione veniale. Si può
immaginare la collusione tra i livelli alti e bassi della politica e la non
trasparenza nei confronti delle persone. Caso comune a molte parti della Cina,
la compravendita della terra è diventato il metodo che i funzionari usano per
arricchirsi.
Gli abitanti dei villaggi si sono appellati più volte alle
autorità, hanno fatto petizioni su petizioni. Gli appelli vengono ignorati, le
azioni schiacciate, la dignità umiliata. Allora [gli abitanti del villaggio]
lanciano una protesta ancora più grande, e quello che incontrano è la polizia
armata di manganelli, scudi e lacrimogeni. E ancora minacce del governo e false
promesse.
Hanno fondato delle organizzazioni autonome di villaggio, hanno
eletto democraticamente i propri leader e accolto giornalisti stranieri. Il
governo, di cui al momento delle petizioni non si vedeva l’ombra, all’improvviso
si desta. Riaffiora lo spirito del “editoriale del 26 aprile” di 22 anni fa
(2).
L’esigua minoranza viene definita come cospiratrice di trame diaboliche
e la restante maggioranza come scriteriati, incitati e strumentalizzati da una
cospirazione di forze ostili straniere.
[…] Come successo in altre città e
villaggi, quello che aspetta [la gente di] Wukan è una ripulita violenta e il
momento opportuno per fare i conti. Alcuni leader sono stati arrestati in
segreto. Xue Jinpo, uno dei capi del villaggio è morto dopo l’arresto.
La
morte può portare terrore, oppure la resistenza a costo della vita. La gente di
Wukan ha scelto la seconda.
Hanno eretto barricate e ostacoli alla polizia,
hanno continuato a ricevere giornalisti stranieri, servendosi dei nuovi media
per portare avanti la propaganda, preparando azioni più grandi, mandando
ultimatum al governo, mettendo in guardia i funzionari implicati…
Il mondo
intero è stato in ansia per la loro sicurezza.
Poi tutto è volto al meglio.
La polizia si è ritirata, e sono arrivati i funzionari per procedere con i
negoziati.
Gli abitanti di Wukan hanno vinto i negoziati. Il governo ha
acconsentito a tre delle loro richieste: la liberazione degli arrestati, la
restituzione dei corpi dei loro morti per effettuare l’autopsia, il
riconoscimento della legittimità delle organizzazioni autonome degli abitanti.
Anche se si tratta di promesse verbali che non è detto vengano realizzate, la
gente di Wukan ha già scritto la storia.
Le dimostrazioni sono ancora in
corso, la polizia se ne è andata: è la prima volta.
Il riconoscimento degli
abitanti del villaggio come soggetto della richiesta di interessi; il ritiro
degli stupidi pretesti di strumentalizzazione e incitamento delle forze ostili
straniere. È  la prima volta.
L’incrinatura del controllo del governo, la
realizzazione di tre mesi di autogoverno, l’elezione di un consiglio di
autogoverno, la vittoria dei diritti civili. È la prima volta.
E soprattutto,
per la prima volta il governo è stato forzato a riconoscere un consiglio
precedentemente definito “organizzazione illegale”.
Ancor più degno di nota,
come ha notato  Chen Ping, il direttore di questa testata, è che per la prima
volta che i contadini cinesi sono saliti sul palco della storia con uno status
di cittadini, mettendo in pratica – per la prima volta nella Cina rurale – un
autogoverno moderno e democratico. […]

Le menzogne inculcate dal governo servendosi di qualunque metodo sono già
diventate  verità per molti. Non solo molti cinesi non le mettono in
discussione, ma sempre più  stranieri annuiscono.
Menzogna numero uno: i
cinesi non sono adatti alla democrazia, che disprezzano.
Il villaggio di
Wukan, ha un nome tipicamente cinese e detiene una ricca tradizione culturale.
Qui le idee patriarcali sono molto radicate e per sessant’anni è stato educato
dal Partito comunista: è un tipico villaggio cinese. Non solo Wukan anela alla
democrazia, ma i suoi abitanti l’hanno realizzata e non esitano a dare la vita
per difenderne i risultati.
Menzogna numero due: i cinesi non sono educati
alla democrazia, i cambiamenti devono avvenire gradualmente.
Di certo la
democrazia è una disciplina, e ha bisogno di essere coltivata nel tempo.  Ma la
base della democrazia, comprensibile anche ai bambini di tre anni, è scegliere
equamente le persone adatte a rappresentare tutti.
Senza la realizzazione
della democrazia il risultato è dispotismo, e non può diventarne causa. […] I
fatti di Wukan dimostrano che i cinesi possono attuare la democrazia come
qualunque altra nazione.
Menzogna numero tre: senza la guida del Partito
comunista, in Cina sarebbe il caos.
Credo che quarant’anni siano stati
sufficienti per radicare il potere e l’influenza del segretario di Partito del
villaggio di Wukan; in caso di rinuncia, il corpo amministrativo ne risulterebbe
paralizzato. Certamente sarebbe così, ma il sistema che verrebbe dopo, non
avrebbe le difficoltà generate dal terrore?
[…]
Menzogna numero quattro:
se non si fa uso della violenza per mantenere la stabilità, le masse perdono la
testa, spaccano, rompono, saccheggiano e bruciano tutto senza limiti.
Le
dimostrazioni di protesta sicuramente possono sfociare in disordini, ma non si
tratta di un errore della democrazia, ma del risultato della corruzione del
dispotismo.
Anche se le dimostrazioni sfociano in disordini, non è comunque
più grave della polizia e dell’esercito che aprono il fuoco sulla gente.
Come
dimostrato dalla protesta di Wukan e altri villaggi, i cinesi non vogliono che
si infami la democrazia. La ricerca dell’ordine e della razionalità supera il
volere egoista dell’ufficiale governativo che opera a suo piacimento in un
sistema autocratico.
[…]

Note al testo:

(1) Con l’espressione 维权运动 “Movimento per la difesa dei diritti” si intende
quel gruppo di avvocati che senza opporsi al sistema legale vigente, sostiene e
difende i diritti civili dei cittadini, attraverso processi legali e attivismo
anche mediatico.
(2) Durante la Protesta di piazza Tian’anmen del 1989,
l’editoriale del 26 aprile del Quotidiano del Popolo condannò come illegali le
dimostrazioni studentesche. L’editoriale aumentò la tensione tra il governo e i
manifestanti, e gli alti dirigenti del PCC discussero se modificarlo.
http://www.tsquare.tv/chronology/April26ed.html

(Traduzione di Lucia De Carlo)

JOURNALIST
CHANG PING YET TO RECEIVE A WORK PERMIT

PUBLISHED ON TUESDAY 6 DECEMBER 2011.

In an open letter in the Hong Kong government, Reporters Without Borders asks
why the visa request by journalist Chang Ping remains unanswered.

6 December 2011

Donald Tsang
Chief Executive
Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region
People’s Republic of China
Tamar, Hong Kong

Immigration Dept.
Immigration Tower,
Wan Chai, Hong Kong

Dear Sir

Visa application by Mr. Zhang Ping

Reporters Without Borders, an organization that campaigns for freedom of the
press and freedom of information, wishes to draw your attention to the case of
Mr. Zhang Ping, also known as Chang Ping (长平).
A journalist and blogger, he is a former deputy editor of Nanfang
Zhoumo (南方周末) and for the past five months he has been unable to take up his
post in Hong Kong as editor of the online magazine Sun Affairs(阳光时务),
owned by Sun TV, which he was due to have started in July this year. Up till now, Zhang Ping has faced unexplained silence on the part of the Hong Kong Immigration Department.

After he was appointed to the post in March, Mr. Zhang Ping applied to your
government’s Immigration Department for a work visa. As a general rule,
applications of this kind are dealt with in four weeks. As of today, he has
received no response, either accepting or rejecting his request. No explanation
has been given for this silence. The department concerned has merely informed
him that his application is under review.

This unusual and unexplained delay leads us to fear there has been direct
political interference by the Beijing authorities with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region in order to prevent the journalist from taking up his post
with a newspaper that Chinese officialdom has had in its sights for several
years. The recent blockage of the website of the Sun TV online magazine
that he was meant to edit is not unrelated to our concerns. With no warning or
explanation, the television station was refused permission by the Chinese
authorities to broadcast its programmes by cable at the end of 2009.

On several occasions Mr. Zhang Ping, a respected journalist in China, has
paid for his
stand in favour of press freedom and his refusal to work under censorship.
In 2008, he was dismissed as deputy editor of the daily Nandu Zhoukan
Zazhi (应为南都周刊杂志) for publishing editorials
on Tibet that were at odds with the official line. On 28 January this year,
he was forced
to resign from his post with Nanfang Baoye Jituan (南方报业集团) for
refusing to make changes to articles he had written. Since then, he has been
banned from publishing anything he has written in any medium, whether in
newspapers or on the Internet. All of his articles published online have been
deleted.

In the light of these worrying events, we request that you do all in you
power to ensure that Mr. Zhang Ping’s work visa is granted without delay so that
he can take up his appointment as soon as possible.

Thank you for your consideration of this matter and please accept my sincere
regards.

Jean-François Julliard
Secretary General, Reporters Without Borders